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NOTE

THE SUN DOESN’T ALWAYS SHINE IN
OHIO: REEVALUATING RENEWABLE
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS IN LIGHT
OF CHANGED CONDITIONS
Jeffery M. Smith*
In 2014, with the signing of Senate Bill 310 (S.B. 310), Ohio became the
first state to put a temporary “freeze” on its renewable portfolio standard (RPS)
and energy efficiency mandates. The law has generated nationwide attention and
been criticized as a step back in the state’s clean energy policy. This Note examines the central justifications for the passage of S.B. 310, challenging conventional
wisdom that the law does not serve the interests of Ohio citizens. After the passage of Ohio’s RPS in 2008, the economic and energy landscape within the state
changed dramatically, due in large part to technological advances allowing for the
development of the state’s large natural gas deposits. In order to fully assess these
changed conditions, as well as the economic impact the energy mandates were
having on ratepayers, Ohio lawmakers passed S.B. 310. While renewable resource advocates argue that increased renewable energy benefits the state of Ohio,
this Note argues that S.B. 310 was an example of prudent lawmaking and should
serve as a model for other states that have undergone changes in their energy
landscape and economic situation since implementing their renewable portfolio
standards.
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INTRODUCTION
America’s energy policy is undergoing rapid change. From the emergence of plentiful domestic sources of natural gas to environmental regulations which will have profound impacts on the way electricity is generated,
the nation’s energy landscape is transforming rapidly and policymakers are
struggling to keep up.1 When designing long-term energy strategies, policymakers must consider a number of competing interests, a task that is complicated during times of contentious policy revision.2 Often, regulators are
forced to balance two seemingly incongruent goals, such as ensuring affordable and reliable electricity while simultaneously promoting reduced emissions from electricity generation.3 The burden of this precarious regulatory
balancing act has fallen largely on states.4
States have attempted to address concerns about global warming, greenhouse gas emissions reductions, and domestic energy independence through
a variety of approaches.5 Perhaps the most widely adopted mechanism to
address these concerns is the renewable portfolio standard (RPS). RPSs are
state statutes that require investor-owned utility companies, or as they are
referred to in Ohio, Electric Distribution Utilities (EDUs),6 to incorporate
a specified percentage of electricity from designated renewable power
1.
FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 875 (Robert C.
Clark et al. eds., 3d ed. 2010).
2.
Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 45 HARV. J. ON L EGIS.
259, 259 (2008).
3.
Id.
4.
See id.
5.
Id.
6.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.01(A)(6) (LexisNexis 2014).
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sources into their fuel mix.7 An RPS mandate is typically intended to “help
make electricity generated from renewables economically competitive with
that generated from fossil fuels.”8 To date, twenty-nine states have implemented an RPS.9
While states differ in their implementation strategies, such as what
qualifies as a “renewable resource”10 and what percentage of electricity must
be derived from these resources, the common theme behind RPSs is the
increased use of renewable energy for electricity generation.11 Even though
RPSs are an effective means of achieving “green” policy objectives, such as
reducing emissions from fossil fuel powered generation facilities and diversifying fuel mixes, they can be highly contentious, primarily due to their
impact on electricity costs.12
In 2008, Ohio passed Senate Bill 221 (S.B. 221) with nearly unanimous
support from both houses,13 making it the twenty-sixth state to establish an
RPS.14 S.B. 221 was primarily intended to stabilize electricity rates during a
time of commodity price volatility and provide the added benefit of decreased dependence on fossil fuels.15 After 2008, however, the economic and
energy landscape within Ohio changed dramatically, due in large part to
technological advances allowing for the development of the state’s large natural gas deposits.16 In 2014, on the back of an improving economy and newfound domestic energy options, Ohio thus became the first state to put a
7.
BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 875.
8.
Id.
9.
Id. at 876.
10.
Generally, renewable resources are “those that can be replaced or renewed without
contributing to global warming or other substantial environmental impacts.” Id. at 834. Five
types of renewable energy are considered most viable: wind, solar (photovoltaic), biomass,
geothermal, and hydroelectric. See id. at 834–66.
11.
See id. at 877.
12.
Patrick R. Jacobi, Note, Renewable Portfolio Standard Generator Applicability Requirements: How States Can Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Dormant Commerce Clause, 30 VT.
L. REV. 1079, 1084 (2006).
13.
See Ben Peyton, Five Year Anniversary of Senate Bill 221 – Ohio’s Groundbreaking
Renewable Energy Standards, INNOVATION OHIO (May 9, 2013), http://innovationohio.org/2013/
05/09/five-year-anniversary-of-senate-bill-221-ohios-groundbreaking-renewable-energy-standards/.
14.
Ohio Becomes 26th State to Create Renewable Portfolio Standard, SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS
.COM (Apr. 28, 2008, 8:49 PM), http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.cfm/go/
news.display/id/15890.
15.
Senate Floor Debate, May 7, 2014, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014)
(statement of Sen. Shannon Jones) (video recording), http://www.ohiochannel.org/MediaLibrary/MediaLibraryEmbed/OhioSenate/Media.aspx?fileId=143636.
16.
See John Funk, Ohio Shale Gas Production Beginning to Look Like a Boom, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER (July 2, 2014, 12:59 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2014/07/ohio
_shale_gas_production_begi.html.
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freeze on its RPS mandate, a mere five years after the law took effect.17
That two-year suspension, enacted in Senate Bill 310 (S.B. 310), has generated nationwide attention and garnered significant criticism.
This Note argues that, despite widespread criticism, Ohio’s reexamination of its RPS policy is an example of prudent lawmaking in light of
changed conditions. Part I provides background into RPS standards generally and explains the nuances of the original Ohio RPS. Part II explains the
changes S.B. 310 made to Ohio’s original RPS standards. Part III examines
potential motivations for the passage of S.B. 310 and concludes that the
underlying economic and environmental conditions within the state necessitated a reexamination of its electricity policy. Finally, Part IV, argues that
the moratorium was not only prudent for Ohio but also should serve as a
model for other states when reevaluating their RPSs in light of changing
domestic energy and economic conditions.

I. HISTORY OF OHIO SENATE BILL 221
Concerns about global warming, greenhouse gas emissions reductions,
and domestic energy independence have spurred intense debate about how
states should balance economic development and environmental responsibility when regulating electricity generators.18 In 2008, in an attempt to balance these concerns, Ohio passed S.B. 221, a comprehensive and aggressive
electricity reform bill which contained both supply-side and demand-side
mandates.19 On the demand side, the bill imposed an Energy Efficiency
Resource Standard (EERS).20 An EERS is a mandate that electrical utility
companies implement energy efficiency programs to reduce customer electricity usage by a specified percentage each year.21 On the supply side, the
17.
See Maria Gallucci, Ohio Gov. Kasich to Sign “Freeze” on State Clean Energy Mandate
by Saturday, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 11, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/ohio-govkasich-sign-freeze-state-clean-energy-mandate-saturday-1598602.
18.
See, e.g., Endrud, supra note 2, at 259.
19.
See S.B. 221, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2008), 2008 Ohio Laws 792
(codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9, 4905, 4928, 4929 (LexisNexis 2014)).
20.
Id.
21.
Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS), AM . COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT
ECON., http://aceee.org/topics/energy-efficiency-resource-standard-eers (last visited Feb. 12,
2015). It should be noted that there is a distinction between energy efficiency and energy
conservation. Energy efficiency measures generally refer to technological advances which
result in less energy consumption for the same amount of utility (such as an energy efficient
light bulb). In contrast, energy conservation reduces energy use by simply using less energy
and thus losing utility (such as turning the lights off while watching television). For a discussion of these differences, see Brandon Hofmeister, Bridging the Gap: Using Social Psychology to
Design Market Interventions to Overcome the Energy Efficiency Gap in Residential Energy Markets,
19 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 3, 7 (2010).
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bill imposes an RPS mandate that requires retail sellers of electricity to
provide a specified amount of electricity from renewable energy sources.22

A. Ohio’s Renewable Portfolio Standard
Ohio’s RPS mandated that, by 2025, at least 25% of the electric supply
come from defined “alternative energy resources,”23 of that, 12.5% and 0.5%
were required to come from “renewable resources” and “solar resources,”
respectively.24 Like many states, Ohio phased in its RPS mandate over
time, increasing the required percentage of renewable generation annually.25
Beginning in 2009, 0.25% of Ohio’s electricity had to be generated from
renewable energy resources, and this percentage increased annually until
2025 when the generation requirement reached 12.5%.26 Finally, at least half
of the renewable energy resources implemented by the utility had to “be
met through facilities located in this state,”27 the so-called in-state mandate.
EDUs can satisfy the renewable energy mandate by operating a qualifying renewable energy facility located within the state, by purchasing renewable energy generated by another’s facility, or by purchasing Renewable
Energy Credits28 from a qualifying renewable energy generator.29 Each
22.
See NANCY RADER & SCOTT HEMPLING, NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL. CO M M ’RS, THE
RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 1 (2001); see also Endrud, supra note 2, at
261.
23.
The term “alternative energy resource” was used in Ohio’s original RPS and was
defined to include “an advanced energy resource or renewable energy resource . . . that the
mercantile customer commits for integration into the electric distribution utility’s demandresponse, energy efficiency, or peak demand reduction programs . . . .” S.B. 221 § 1, 127th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2008), 2008 Ohio Laws 833 (codified as amended at OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(A)(1)). Qualifying resources included, but were not limited to,
resources that improved the relationship between real and reactive power, biomass technology, energy storage technology, and electric generation that uses a renewable energy resource. Id. The term “alternative energy resource” was replaced with “qualifying renewable
energy resource” in 2014. See S.B. 310 § 1, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014), 2014
Ohio Laws *20 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3706, 4928 (LexisNexis 2014)).
24.
S.B. 221 § 1, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2008), 2008 Ohio Laws 835
(codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64).
25.
See Joshua P. Fershee, Renewable Mandates and Goals, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY:
EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 85, 77 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011).
26.
S.B. 221 § 1, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2008), 2008 Ohio Laws 835
(codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64).
27.
Id.
28.
A Renewable Energy Certificate “represents the property rights to the environmental, social, and other nonpower qualities of renewable electricity generation.” U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs), GREEN POWER PARTNERSHIP, http://www
.epa.gov/greenpower/gpmarket/rec.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2015). They allow renewable
electricity providers the opportunity to sell these positive externalities to other under-compliant utilities. Id.
29.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(B)(3), 4928.645 (LexisNexis 2014).
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year, the Ohio Public Utilities Commission reviews the EDU’s compliance
with the most recent applicable benchmark and, if it determines an EDU is
under-compliant or non-compliant, it imposes a fine that cannot be passed
through to customers.30 What qualifies as a “renewable energy resource” is
outlined in Section 3706.25(E) of the Ohio Revised Code, defining “renewable energy resource” as “solar photovoltaic or solar thermal energy, wind
energy, power produced by a hydroelectric facility[,] . . . geothermal energy,
[and] . . . fuel derived from solid waste . . . .”31 However, due to the unique
geographical and meteorological features of Ohio, compliance relies largely
on wind energy.32

B. Ohio’s Energy Efficiency Resource Standard
S.B. 221 also established an Energy Efficiency Resource Standard
(EERS). EERSs are benchmark requirements mandating electric utility
companies to reduce their customer’s demand by a specified amount of energy each year.33 Energy reductions are “typically expressed as a percentage
of annual retail energy sales or as specific energy savings amounts set over a
long-term period.”34 These energy savings are usually specified by statute,
mandating electrical utilities to help customers reduce their energy consumption.35 While EERS requirements vary widely across states, the rationale for mandatory energy savings is typically the same: “Improving the
environment, reducing the need for new generation and transmission, helping consumers realize the benefits of energy efficiency investments, encouraging economic development and green jobs, and promoting energy
security.”36
S.B. 221’s EERS mandated a 22% reduction in the annual average energy consumption by 202537 and a 7.75% reduction in peak demand by
30.
Id. § 4928.64(C)(2).
31.
Id. § 3706.25(E).
32.
See Ohio Wind Energy, AM . WIND ENERGY ASS’N, http://www.awea.org/Resources/
state.aspx?ItemNumber=5395 (last visited Feb. 21, 2015) (reporting that, as of April 2014,
Ohio had installed 246 wind turbines and ranked 25th among states for number of utilityscale wind turbines).
33.
See EERS, supra note 21.
34.
MICHAEL SCIORTINO ET AL., AM . COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., REP . NO.
U112, ENERGY EFFICIENCY RESOURCE STANDARDS: A PROGRESS REPORT ON STATE EXPERIENCE ii
(2011).
35.
John C. Dernbach & Marianne Tyrrell, Federal Energy Efficiency and Conservation
Laws, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY, supra note 25, at 41.
36.
Timothy J. Brennan & Karen L. Palmer, Energy Efficiency Resource Standards: Economics and Policy, 25 UTIL . POL’Y 58, 59 (2013).
37.
Reductions are based on the “annual average, and normalized kilowatt-hour sales of
the electric distribution utility during the preceding three calendar years to customers in
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2018.38 Upon implementation of S.B. 221 in 2009, the incremental demand
reduction requirements began rather slowly, at three-tenths of one percent
of the annual average energy demand. By 2014 however, the mandates increased precipitously, requiring a one percent decrease each year from 2014
through 2018 and a two percent decrease each year thereafter until 2025.39

II. S.B. 310: REEVALUATING OHIO’S ENERGY POLICY
Only five years after implementation of its RPS, Ohio substantially
revised its energy policy by passing S.B. 310. Among the most notable provisions of the bill, S.B. 310 froze the incremental RPS and EERS
benchmarks at 2014 levels for two years,40 allowed commercial and industrial customers to opt-out of the utility’s energy efficiency plan,41 eliminated the in-state mandate,42 created an Energy Mandate Study Committee
to make decisions regarding future changes to Ohio’s RPS, and forced utilities to disclose on customer bills the individual customer’s cost of the utility’s compliance with the RPS.43 Each of these contentious provisions is
described in turn below.

A. S.B. 310 Temporarily Froze the Renewable
Portfolio Standard
S.B. 310 placed a two-year moratorium on renewable energy mandates
under the RPS. Similar to the energy efficiency mandates described supra in
Section I.B, S.B. 310 froze the incremental renewable energy increases at
2014 levels for two years.44 Thus, rather than allowing the 2015 and 2016
benchmarks to increase from 3.5% and 4.5% respectively, S.B. 310 allows
mandates to remain at 2.5% until 2017, at which point the benchmarks will
continue their incremental climb, ultimately reaching 12.5% by the end of
[Ohio].” S.B. 221 § 1, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2008), 2008 Ohio Laws 839
(codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.66(A)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2014)).
38.
Peak demand reduction targets required a one percent decrease in “peak demand in
2009 and an additional seventy-five hundredths of one percent reduction each year through
2018.” Id. In 2018, the “standing committees in the house of representatives and the senate
primarily dealing with energy issues,” were to make further recommendations regarding future peak demand reduction targets. Id.; see also id. at 840 (codified as amended at
§ 4928.66(B)).
39.
S.B. 221 § 1, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2008), 2008 Ohio Laws 839
(codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.66).
40.
S.B. 310 § 1, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014), 2014 Ohio Laws *19
(codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2014)).
41.
Id. at *26–30 (codified at § 4928.66).
42.
Id. at *20 (codified at § 4928.64).
43.
Id. at *25 (codified at § 4928.65(A)(1)).
44.
Id. at *35 (codified at § 4928.64(B)(2)).

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA106.txt

296

unknown

Seq: 8

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

23-DEC-15

11:43

[Vol. 5:1

2026.45 The two year freeze is designed to allow the Energy Mandates
Study Committee (EMSC), discussed at length below in Section II.D, time
to evaluate the effectiveness of the renewable energy mandates.46
Like the RPS moratorium, S.B. 310 placed a two-year freeze on incremental increases to Ohio’s EERS mandates. Rather than increasing energy
savings requirements 1% annually from 2014 through 2018, S.B. 310 implements an equation for calculating EERS requirements in 2015 and 2016, if
the results of this equation are zero, “the utility shall not be required to
achieve additional energy savings for that year . . . .”47 The two-year freeze
on the EERS allows the EMSC and policymakers the opportunity to better
understand the impact the EERS has had since its inception. As described
supra in Part I, the EERS demand reductions began slowly and increased
annually. Therefore, rather than continuing the perennial demand reduction
mandates, S.B. 310 freezes demand reduction at 2014 levels.48
The requirements to decrease demand every year put a lot of pressure
on EDUs. As a result, they had to implement increasing compliance measures, measures that, by statute, could be recovered by rate increases.49 The
recovery of costs incurred by implementing energy efficiency measures are
typically passed on to customers through “tariff riders” which are “special
rate schedules that create an additional rate charged to all customers used to
fund demand-side energy conservation programs.”50 As the compliance requirements under S.B. 221 began to turn sharply upwards, compliance riders increased exponentially.51 These rising utility costs caught the attention
45.
Id.
46.
See Senate Floor Debate, May 7, 2014, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014)
(statement of Sen. Shannon Jones) (video recording), http://www.ohiochannel.org/Media
Library/MediaLibraryEmbed/OhioSenate/Media.aspx?fileId=143636 (“We’re not eliminating these benchmarks, we are simply freezing them for a period of time, two years, to allow
us the opportunity to settle in and understand the change in the marketplace, to understand
the impact these mandates are having on businesses and ratepayers, and if the legislature
doesn’t act we revert to what is now current law.”).
47.
S.B. 310 § 1, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014), 2014 Ohio Laws *26
(codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.66(A)(1)(a)).
48.
Id. at *19 (codified at § 4928.64).
49.
See OHIO ADMIN . CODE 4901:1-39-07(A) (2013). After filing a proposed energy
efficiency plan, electric utilities “may submit a request for recovery of an approved rate
adjustment mechanism, commencing after approval of the electric utility’s program portfolio
plan, of costs due to electric utility peak-demand reduction, demand response, energy efficiency program costs, appropriate lost distribution revenues, and shared savings.” Id.
50.
Alexandra B. Klass & John K. Harting, State and Municipal Energy Efficiency Laws,
in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY, supra note 25, at 62.
51.
See Hearing on S.B. 310 Before the S. Pub. Util. Comm., 130th Gen. Assemb., *18
(Oh. Apr. 9, 2014) (statement of Sam Randazzo, General Counsel, Industrial Energy UsersOhio), http://www.ohiogreenstrategies.com/documents/randazzotestimony.pdf (“[T]he Alternative Energy Resource (‘AER’) Rider applicable to customers served by AEP-Ohio has
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of large industrial ratepayers and, ultimately, members of the Ohio General
Assembly, paving the way for S.B. 310.52

B. S.B. 310 Authorized Energy-Intensive Industrial Customers
to “Opt Out” of the EERS
To help balance the desire for energy efficiency with the need for Ohio
manufacturers to remain competitive, S.B. 310 contains an opt-out provision for energy-intensive industrial customers.53 Under this provision, industrial customers, after providing written notice and a personalized
reduction plan to the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) of their
intent to opt-out of the utility’s portfolio plan, will not be subject to any
EERS cost recovery mechanisms.54 Though critics claim the opt-out provision undermines the energy saving initiatives by granting immunity to the
most energy-intensive customers,55 the provision is not a windfall for industrial customers. In fact, customers electing to opt-out are required to submit
an initial personalized reduction plan to PUCO “summariz[ing] the
projects, actions, policies, or practices that the customer may consider implementing . . . for the purpose of reducing energy intensity,” a process
which must be repeated every two years thereafter.56 Therefore, under S.B.
310, energy-intensive industrial customers will continue to implement costeffective strategies to reduce energy usage, but without being subjected to
reduction percentages arbitrarily imposed by the government.

recently increased by 200% in the Columbus Southern zone and 400% in the Ohio Power
zone. Large employers throughout Ohio are paying between $1 million and $2 million per
year based on the current compliance requirements . . . .”).
52.
Telephone Interview with Sen. Troy Balderson, sponsor of Ohio S.B. 310 (Feb. 11,
2015) (stating that constituents grew concerned about higher electric bills); Memorandum
from Keith Lake, Vice Pres. Gov’t. Affairs, Oh. Chamber of Commerce to Sen. Bill Seitz,
Chairman, S. Pub. Util. Comm. (Apr. 8, 2014) (on file with author) (“Ohioans have already
paid nearly a billion dollars to comply with the costly law, and these mandates will continue
to increase annually until 2025. Absent any action by the General Assembly, forecasts suggest the growing benchmarks mean Ohio ratepayers could be paying over $500 million per
year by 2020.”).
53.
See S.B. 310, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014), 2014 Ohio Laws *31–32
(codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.6611).
54.
Id. at *32 (codified at § 4928.6613).
55.
Martin Kushler, Ohio SB 310 Post Mortem: It’s Worse than You Thought, AM . COUNCIL
FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON. BLOG (June 23, 2014, 1:13 PM), http://aceee.org/blog/2014/06/
ohio-sb-310-post-mortem-it-s-worse-yo.
56.
S.B. 310 § 1, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014), 2014 Ohio Laws *33
(codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.6616(A)–(B)).
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C. S.B. 310 Eliminated the Requirement that Fifty Percent of
Renewable Energy Production Be Generated in State
S.B. 310 eliminated the in-state mandate in the RPS, which required at
least one half of the renewable energy mandate be met through facilities
located within Ohio.57 Opponents argue that removal of the in-state mandate will stymie Ohio’s emerging renewable energy market and dissuade
future investors.58 However, like any protectionist measure, Ohio’s in-state
mandate was, by definition, also an out-of-state exclusion, triggering dormant commerce clause consideration. In fact, concern over dormant commerce clause implications of RPS in-state mandates is longstanding. In
2001, Rader and Scott noted that “[a]bsent a significant change in Supreme
Court application of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the
restriction to in-state generation will, if challenged, be found unconstitutional.”59 More recently, courts have reaffirmed the notion that a state cannot discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy without violating the
Commerce Clause.60 Therefore, despite the risk of sending renewable energy jobs across state lines, S.B. 310’s removal of the in-state mandate was
necessary to conform to the Court’s current dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.

D. S.B. 310 Created the Energy Mandate Study Committee to
Assess the Future of Ohio’s RPS
S.B. 310 created the Energy Mandates Study Committee (EMSC) to
analyze the effects of the mandates and make recommendations to the General Assembly.61 The EMSC consists of twelve members of the Ohio General Assembly, six from the House and six from the Senate, tasked with
evaluating the effects of the mandates and providing future recommendations to the General Assembly.62 By statute, the EMSC is required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis and assess the environmental impact of the RPS
57.
See S.B. 221, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2008), 2008 Ohio Laws 792
(codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9, 4905, 4928, 4929 (LexisNexis 2014)).
58.
Editorial, Kasich Must Veto Unacceptable S.B. 310 when Revamped Energy Bill Reaches
His Desk, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER (May 8, 2014, 3:24 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/
index.ssf/2014/05/kasich_must_veto_unacceptable.html.
59.
RADER & HEMPLING, supra note 22, at A-1.
60.
Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that a
state “cannot, without violating the commerce clause of Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy”).;
61.
S.B. 310 § 4(A), 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014), 2014 Ohio Laws *34.
62.
Id. In addition to the twelve members of the General Assembly, the chairperson of
the Ohio Public Utilities Commission acts as an ex officio, nonvoting member. Id.
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and EERS mandates.63 This evidence-based analysis is vitally important
because states often set renewable targets “without knowing how much electricity can be generated from renewable resources . . . or . . . wors[e] completely arbitrar[ily].”64 In fact, Ohio Senator Troy Balderson stated that this
is exactly what happened in Ohio, noting that the “mandates were developed in 2008 void of any evidence-based scientific calculation, and the Ohio
consumer has been paying for the costs and consequence of the arbitrarily
developed plan.”65
Critics of the two-year examination period claim it is simply a precursor to outright repeal.66 In response, section 3 of S.B. 310 makes it clear the
EMSC will gain “a better understanding of how energy mandates impact
jobs and the economy in Ohio . . . [and] to review all energy resources as
part of its efforts to address energy pricing issues.”67 The EMSC was tasked
with assessing Ohio’s EERS and RPS in light of changed circumstances and
to use evidence-based methodologies to make recommendations on future
mandate alterations, if any. In essence, S.B. 310 acts as somewhat of a “do
over” since little evidence-based analysis was done at the time the mandates
were adopter under S.B. 221.68 In accordance with S.B. 310, on September
30, 2015, the EMSC submitted a report to the Ohio General Assembly
including, inter alia, a cost-benefit analysis of the renewable energy and
energy efficiency mandates, a recommendation of the best evidence-based
standard for reviewing the mandates in the future, and an assessment of the
environmental impact of the renewable energy, energy efficiency, and peak
demand reduction mandates on reductions of greenhouse gas and fossil fuel
emissions.69
After eight public hearings, which included testimony from a variety of
experts and stakeholders, the EMSC issued its final report, which included
63.
Id. at § 4(C)(1)–(8).
64.
BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 894.
65.
Memorandum from Sen. Troy Balderson to Ohio S. Pub. Util. Comm. (June 2014)
(on file with author).
66.
See Dan Gearino, Kasich Signs Bill Freezing ‘Green’ Energy Requirements, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH (June 14, 2014, 5:41 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2014/
06/13/kasich-signs-bill-freezing-green-energy-rules.html.
67.
S.B. 310 § 3, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014), 2014 Ohio Laws *34
(codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3706, 4928 (LexisNexis 2014)).
68.
Telephone Interview with Troy Balderson, Sen, State of Ohio (Feb. 11, 2015). Senator Balderson, sponsor of Ohio S.B. 310, noted that the intention of the study committee
was not to eliminate the mandates. Instead, he wants to use science-based energy efficiency
because under Senate Bill 221 “it seemed like we were just picking numbers out.” Id.
69.
S.B. 310 § 4(C)(1)–(8), 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014), 2014 Ohio
Laws *35–36 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3706, 4928).
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five recommendations to the Ohio General Assembly.70 Among them, the
EMSC recommended to switch from energy mandates to energy incentives
and to extend the S.B. 310 moratorium indefinitely.71 Despite finding that
residential electricity prices increased in 2014 due to the RPS and EERS
mandates,72 the EMSC noted that “energy efficiency can provide great
value if it is structured properly.”73 Therefore, the EMSC determined that
an indefinite freeze at current levels, along with allowing EDUs to offer
voluntary energy efficiency programs, provides maximum flexibility for
compliance with pending federal environmental legislation.74 Thus, as intended, S.B. 310 allows Ohio legislators the opportunity to address the environmental and economic impact the RPS mandates have had in the five
years since their implementation, without outright repeal.
In addition, during the two-year freeze, Ohio lawmakers have the opportunity to determine how the EERS will impact economic competition
between states. Currently, about half of the states have no energy efficiency
requirements at all and, of those that do, many have mandates that are far
less restrictive than Ohio.75 Energy-intensive industrial customers are particularly sensitive to rising electricity rates and Ohio, as well as many other
Midwestern states, relies heavily on the industrial manufacturing sector for
jobs and economic sustainability.76 Therefore, the EMSC is vital in assessing what effects the RPS and EERS have had thus far, and how Ohio’s
energy policy can help promote economic development within the state.
70.
ENERGY MANDATE STUDY CO M M ., CO-CHAIRS’ REPORT 2, 11–16, 131st Gen. Assemb.
(Ohio 2015).
71.
Id. at 11–16.
72.
Id. at 3–6.
73.
Id. at 15.
74.
Id. at 11. In reference to the EPA Clean Power Plan, the EMSC determined that
“as long as legal questions remain pending, the General Assembly should refrain from allowing escalating costs to be paid by Ohio ratepayers in the form of increased Mandates or
making any significant changes to the State of Ohio’s energy policies without knowing
whether the CPP will ever apply.” Id.
75.
Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES &
EFFICIENCY (June 2015), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/
2014/11/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf; Senate Floor Debate, May 7, 2014, 130th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014) (statement of Sen. Bill Seitz) (video recording), http://www
.ohiochannel.org/MediaLibrary/MediaLibraryEmbed/OhioSenate/Media.aspx?fileId=143636
(listing several states with less ambitious efficiency mandates than Ohio and raising concern
that Ohio manufacturers are facing global competition from companies that are not subjected
to increased electric rates caused by efficiency mandates).
76.
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, in July 2015, approximately 12.7%
of the jobs in Ohio were from manufacturing. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Ohio, ECONOMY AT A GLANCE, http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.oh.htm#eag_oh.f.P (last visited Aug. 21, 2015).
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E. S.B. 310 Increased Utility Bill Transparency
The final major provision of S.B. 310 requires utility companies to disclose, on every customer’s bill, the cost of their participation in the energy
efficiency and renewable energy mandates.77 Studies show that, all things
being equal, ratepayers would prefer to receive their energy from renewable
sources.78 However, as discussed below in Section III.C, many consumers
lack information about the true cost of renewable energy. S.B. 310 requires
EDUs to disclose on customer utility bills the individual cost of compliance
with RPS and EE mandates. The cost disclosures must be listed as distinct
line items, one for costs related to the RPS and one for EERS.79 The disclosure requirement will allow customers to make an informed decision
about the tradeoffs between energy mandates and cost.80

III. DISPELLING MYTHS: THE REASONING BEHIND THE CHANGE
To understand why Ohio lawmakers decided to reform an energy policy
that was only five years old, it is important to have some insight into the
political, economic, and other factors at play in the state. First, two theories
of the legislative process offer some insight: (1) interest group theory (and
its subset, public choice theory) and (2) positive political theory. Second, a
lack of transparency regarding the costs of wind energy to the consumer
provides a potential explanation for S.B. 310’s passage. Lastly, Ohio
lawmakers passed S.B. 310, in part, in response to changed economic conditions and new energy sources in Ohio.

A. Interest Group Theory Does Not Fully Explain
the Passage of S.B. 310
Perhaps the most widespread criticism of S.B. 310 is that it represents
interest group politics designed to “boost the coffers” of electrical utility
77.
See S.B. 310 § 1, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014), 2014 Ohio Laws *25
(codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.65(A)(1)(a)–(c) (LexisNexis 2014)).
78.
Meg Handley, Poll: Americans Overwhelmingly Support Alternative Energy, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP . (Apr. 1, 2013, 12:01 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/
04/01/poll-americans-overwhelmingly-support-alternative-energy.
79.
S.B. 310 § 1, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014), 2014 Ohio Laws *26
(codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.65(C)).
80.
Notably, however, Ohio’s disclosure statements will not include the costs of the
health and environmental externalities associated with fossil fuel generation. See S.B. 310
§ 1, 2014 Ohio Laws *26 (codified at § 4928.65(A)). Nonetheless, Ohio will be one of the
first states to attempt to provide greater transparency in the comparative costs of energy
sources on customer utility bills.
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companies.81 Interest group theory suggests that groups exert a disproportionate influence on governments and politicians, often at the expense of
the broader public interest and the less advantaged.82 Interest groups can be
defined as “any group that pursues contested political or policy goals, and
that is widely regarded by the public as being one contending interest
among others.”83 There are several variations on the theory. One variation,
known as public choice theory, applies economic principles to political decision making as a way of explaining how politically-motivated interest
groups are formed.84 Under public choice theory, all political actors—
lawmakers, candidates, and voters—are seen as rational actors who make
political decisions with the intention of maximizing utility, similar to how
consumers make decisions in the economic marketplace.85 Therefore, rational actors will participate in the political system when the perceived benefit they expect to receive outweighs the cost of becoming involved.
Under public choice theory, clean energy legislation is a public good
that applies to society generally by providing cleaner air for all citizens. Few
individuals will get personally involved in the political process because the
probability that they will affect the outcome is outweighed by the burden of
becoming involved. Thus, more influential stakeholders, such as industry
81.
See Rep. Mike Foley, Senate Bill 310 Is Step Backwards for Clean Energy in Ohio,
CLEV. PLAIN DEALER (June 15, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/
2014/06/senate_bill_310_is_step_backwa.html (stating there are “no benefits to Senate Bill
310” and that S.B. 221 “crumbled under the weight of special interests and big utility companies”); see also Lindsay Abram, How the Koch Brothers Stole Ohio, SALON (June 18, 2014), http://
www.salon.com/2014/06/18/how_the_koch_brothers_stole_ohio/ (interviewing former Ohio
gubernatorial candidate Ed Fitzgerald, who argues that S.B. 310 passed due to political influence exerted by special interest and lobbyist groups); John Funk, Ohio Renewable Energy and
Efficiency Rules Frozen for Two Years as Gov. John Kasich Signs Legislation, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER
(June 13, 2014), http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2014/06/ohio_renewable_ener
gy_and_effi.html (“Senate Bill 310, created by the Republican legislative majorities at the
behest of the utilities and some of the state’s largest industries, keeps the annually increasing
mandates at this year’s levels until 2017 . . . .”); Tom Knox, Renewables Freeze Baffles Opponents but Backers Say ‘Hysteria’ Unwarranted, COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST (May 29, 2014, 11:03 AM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/blog/2014/05/renewables-freeze-baffles-opponentsbut-backers.html?page=2 (arguing that utilities and business groups, threatening high prices
on ratepayers, have “chip[ped] away at the standards”).
82.
KAY L EHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 68 (1986).
83.
Peter Schunk, Against (and For) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 553, 558 (1997).
84.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., L EGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 88 (2nd
ed. 2006).
85.
Id.; see also Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983).

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA106.txt

Fall 2015]

unknown

Seq: 15

The Sun Doesn’t Always Shine in Ohio

23-DEC-15

11:43

303

and business interest groups, will exert disproportionate influence on the
legislature than the diffuse public, or so the argument goes.
While critics of S.B. 310 focus on whether lobby groups influenced its
passage of S.B. 310, they fail to address the key concern of public choice
theory: whether the legislature’s passage of S.B. 310 was in accordance with
societal desires. If the majority of citizens desired social change—in this case
change to Ohio’s electricity policy—and this change was brought to the attention of lawmakers via interest groups, the lobby provided a social good.
According to an April 2014 poll, a majority of Ohio voters said that the
government should not mandate reductions in electricity use.86 The same
poll showed that 71% of customers would favor allowing ratepayers to decide whether to pay for the costs of mandates and roughly the same percentage said they would support repealing energy efficiency mandates in light of
emerging low-cost energy options.87 Interestingly, public opinion on renewable energy and energy efficiency seems to be significantly negatively correlated with cost.88 When polling was conducted without taking costs into
account, Ohioans seemed to overwhelming support renewable energy.89
Therefore, whether or not S.B. 310 reflects public opinion likely depends
less on who brings the issue to the attention of lawmakers and more on how
individual voters value the competing interests of economy and
environment.
86.
TARRANCE GROUP, PRESENTATION TO OHIOANS FOR SUSTAINABLE JOBS: A SURVEY OF VOTER
ATTITUDES IN OHIO (Jan. 2014).
87.
Id. at 6.
88.
Compare id. at 3 (reporting that, when told that energy efficiency mandates could
cost ratepayers two hundred and twenty-seven dollars per year by 2025, sixty-eight percent
of respondents disagree that the government should mandate electricity reductions), with
Memorandum from Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin, Metz, & Assocs. to Ohio Advanced Energy
Econ., Ohio Voters Register Strong Support for Current Standards for Energy Efficiency
and Clean Energy; More Oppose a Freeze (Apr. 15, 2014), http://ohioadvancedenergy.org/
wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Ohio-Energy-Summary-Memo-4-15-14-FINAL.pdf (reporting
that when asked about energy efficiency mandates that “require[] major electric utilities to
provide programs through which customers can more affordably make energy efficiency upgrades to their homes,” eighty-six percent of respondents supported the mandates).
89.
See Memorandum from Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin, Metz, & Assocs., supra note 88.
The poll results tend to differ based on the manner in which questions were presented. For
example, when questions were posed as “mandates” rather than “standards” they received less
support. Id. Further, when questions mentioned the cost of mandates, such as “[e]stimates
say that the programs may cost customers as much as two hundred and twenty-seven dollars
per year by 2025. Knowing this . . . [d]o you agree or disagree that the government should
mandate reductions in electricity use by Ohio’s residential and business users,” citizens were
opposed to the mandates; whereas cost-neutral questions such as whether customers support
a “law in Ohio that requires major electric utilities to gradually increase their use of renewable energy like wind and solar,” showed significant support. Id. at 2.
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Nonetheless, the legislative history of S.B. 310 does, in fact, lend some
credence to the interest group theory. The Ohio Senate Public Utilities
Committee heard over fifty-one hours of testimony on S.B. 310, a sizeable
portion of which was provided by various business coalitions, industry
groups, and environmental groups.90 One of the prevalent criticisms of S.B.
310 is that it is simply a manifestation of big utility company91 influence;
however such an argument is largely fallacious and overly simplistic. While
there is no question that EDUs such as FirstEnergy supported the passage
of S.B. 310,92 in the fifty-one hours of testimony before the Senate Public
Utilities Committee, interest groups on both sides of the issue presented
evidence about the effects of Ohio’s RPS.93 In fact, contrary to the popular
opposition talking point, Senator Michael Skindell, in his floor testimony in
opposition to S.B. 310, stated that representatives from the investor owned
utilities did not speak during committee meetings.94 In explaining this distinct lack of EDU testimony, Senator Bill Seitz noted that electrical utilities
are, to some degree, indifferent about environmental mandates, stating that
“they’ll do anything we tell them to do as long as they get to pass the costs
along to the rate payers.”95 In fact, Ohio’s RPS, codified in Ohio Revised
Code 4928, specifically allows EDU’s to recover, from consumers, ongoing
costs from renewable energy procurement contracts entered into prior to
passage of S.B. 310.96 Therefore, interest group theory, particularly as it
90.
See Senate Floor Debate, May 7, 2014, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014)
(statement of Sen. Shannon Jones) (video recording), http://www.ohiochannel.org/MediaLibrary/MediaLibraryEmbed/OhioSenate/Media.aspx?fileId=143636.
91.
See Foley, supra note 81.
92.
After the passage of S.B. 310, FirstEnergy released a statement noting: “FirstEnergy is pleased that Ohio took a positive step toward reforming the state’s costly energy
efficiency and renewable energy mandates. . . . Senate Bill 310 will benefit consumers and
support job growth in Ohio by holding the line on further bill increases to pay for energy
efficiency programs.” John Funk, Ohio Renewable Energy and Efficiency Rules Frozen for Two
Years as Gov. John Kasich Signs Legislation, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER (June, 13, 2014, 2:21 PM), http:/
/www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2014/06/ohio_renewable_energy_and_effi.html.
93.
Telephone Interview with Sen. Troy Balderson, sponsor of Ohio S.B. 310 (Feb. 11,
2015).
94.
See Senate Floor Debate, May 7, 2014, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014)
(statement of Sen. Skindell) (video recording), http://www.ohiochannel.org/MediaLibrary/
MediaLibraryEmbed/OhioSenate/Media.aspx?fileId=143636 (noting that rather than testifying in committee meetings, the representatives from the Ohio investor-owned utilities just
“sit back and gloat”).
95.
See Senate Floor Debate, May 7, 2014, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014)
(statement of Sen. Bill Seitz) (video recording), http://www.ohiochannel.org/MediaLibrary/
MediaLibraryEmbed/OhioSenate/Media.aspx?fileId=143636. Senator Seitz is the Chairman
of the Ohio Senate Public Utilities Commission and introduced his own bill to amend the
Ohio RPS, which later gave way to S.B. 310.
96.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.641(A) (LexisNexis 2014).
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pertains to EDUs, provides an incomplete description of the political process behind the reexamination of Ohio’s RPS.

B. Positive Political Theory Serves as a Stronger Model for the
Forces Behind the Passage of S.B. 310
A sub-category of institutional theory, positive political theory (PPT)
applies game theory principles to the political process.97 PPT recognizes
that political players, such as legislators, understand the political process
and anticipate the response of other political actors who will influence the
policy outcome.98 Since a legislator understands that any outcome will be
dependent on the preferences of other decisionmakers, she will anticipate
the other party’s reaction and act strategically to ensure that the ultimate
outcome is as close to her preference as possible.99 In game theory this
anticipated response describes a sequential game in which each player’s
choice is “determined not only by her preference on a topic, but also by her
place in the institutional structure and her understanding of the preferences
of other players who follow her.”100
As applied, S.B. 310 was not the first bill to propose a reevaluation of
Ohio’s RPS. In 2013, Ohio Senator Kris Jordan introduced Senate Bill 34
(S.B. 34) which would have repealed the RPS altogether.101 Despite early
support, S.B. 34 began to wane once Senator Bill Seitz introduced Senate
Bill 58 (S.B. 58), which called for amending, rather than outright repeal of,
S.B. 221 and the RPS.102 In discussing the competing bill introduced by
fellow Republican Senator Seitz, Senator Jordan noted “I know he supports
in concept mine, my ideas, but he’s trying to bring everyone to the table.
He’s throwing out a lot more compromises right now than I am.”103 While
S.B. 58 ultimately gave way to S.B. 310, at the time Senator Jordan said he
would support a compromise bill because “it takes us in the right direction.”104 S.B. 310 sponsor Troy Balderson echoed the concept of compromise. When describing what initially brought the issues of Ohio’s energy
97.
ESKRIDGE, supra note 84, at 104.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
100.
Id. at 105.
101.
S.B. 34, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014), http://archives.legislature
.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=130_SB_34.
102.
See S.B. 58, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014), http://archives.legislature
.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=130_SB_58; see also, Tom Knox, Let Market Drive Technologies, COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST (Mar. 14, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/print-ed
ition/2014/03/14/let-market-drive-technologies.html?page=.
103.
Knox, supra note 102.
104.
Id.
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policy to his attention, Senator Balderson stated that “it was a compromise,”
noting that he originally supported S.B. 58 but realized it was not feasible
and, thus, devised S.B. 310.105
S.B. 310 clearly exemplifies a strategic compromise between repeal and
the status quo. Though not ultimately adopted, S.B. 34 offered an opportunity for deliberation and paved the way for alternatives, such as S.B. 310,
that were more amenable to a broader base. Outright repeal likely would
not have passed the Ohio legislature. Therefore, drafters had to anticipate
the response of their opponents and draft a bill that would allow for reexamination without outright rejection. There is little doubt that both interest
group theory and positive political theory played a role in the passage of
S.B. 310. However, the complexities of S.B. 310 are ill-explained by theory
alone and must be examined in light of the environmental and economic
impact that the RPS had in the five years since their implementation.

C. Ohio Needed to Re-Evaluate the Costs and
Tradeoffs of Wind Energy
Having thus determined that, contrary to claims otherwise, the passage
of S.B. 310 cannot be explained entirely based on interest group politics, it
is important to understand what real-world implications prompted Ohio to
become the first state to freeze its RPS. The following section explores the
hidden costs of renewable power and how the desire to evaluate cost tradeoffs may have encouraged Ohio lawmakers to pass S.B. 310.
For a variety of reasons, it is difficult to determine what the net impact
of the RPS has been on Ohio ratepayers since its inception. Renewable
energy advocates argue that RPSs have a positive economic impact by creating new jobs, spurring investment in renewable energy, and increasing the
tax base.106 However, some studies outright contradict these claims, finding
that RPSs lead to job loss, decreased property values, and overall negative
economic impacts.107 In Ohio, there has similarly been little consensus on
the true economic impact of the state’s RPS. But, there is some indication
that electricity prices have increased since the RPS was implemented.
While electricity price changes in Ohio could be attributed to factors
other than the RPS including Ohio’s change from regulated to deregulated
105.
Telephone Interview with Sen. Troy Balderson, sponsor of Ohio S.B. 310 (Feb. 11,
2015).
106.
See Renewable Electricity Standards, AM . WIND ENERGY ASS’N, http://awea.org/advocacy/content.aspx?itemnumber=5217 (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).
107.
RANDY T. SIMMONS ET AL., UTAH STATE UNIV., RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: NORTH
CAROLINA (2015), http://www.usu.edu/ipe/index.php/renewable-portfolio-standards-northcarolina/.
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electricity markets, a controversial study from Utah State University indicates that, if left unchanged, Ohio’s RPS will cost ratepayers $1.92 billion in
increased electricity costs.108 In year 2026 alone, electricity prices are estimated to increase 0.20 cents per kilowatt-hour.109 According to PUCO’s
Ohio Utility Rate Survey, standard service offer electricity rates have increased every year since the passage of S.B. 221.110 While advances in renewable energy technology may decrease costs over time,111 S.B. 310 allows
Ohio policymakers the opportunity to reassess the economic impact the
RPS is having on electricity rates.
For customers, S.B. 310 creates more transparency, allowing ratepayers
to see, on their bills, exactly how the RPS affects them.112 Often, customers
are left uninformed about the actual cost of renewable energy. Since most
renewable energy sources rely on intermittent fuel sources, they require
backup from fossil fuel facilities, typically natural gas plants.113 In fact, due
to current inefficiencies in energy storage, “[a] rise in wind power [would]
most likely just cause a thermal plant to switch from generation to standby,
in which mode it continues to burn fuel.”114 And while recent estimates
indicate decreasing capital costs and increased capacity factor for wind
projects,115 studies indicate that the all-in cost for wind energy continues to

108.
RANDY T. SIMMONS ET AL., UTAH STATE UNIV., RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS: OHIO
6, tbl. 1 (2015), http://www.usu.edu/ipe/index.php/renewable-portfolio-standards-ohio/.
Simmons’ study has drawn criticism due to methodological concerns as well his affiliation
with pro-fossil fuel interests. See Erik Wemple, Newsweek Adds Disclosure About Koch Ties of
Professor Who Wrote Anti-Wind Power Piece, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2015/04/21/newsweek-adds-disclosure-about-kochties-of-professor-who-wrote-anti-wind-power-piece/.
109.
Id.
110.
See Ohio Utility Rate Survey, PUB . UTIL . CO M M ’N OF OHIO, http://www.puco.ohio
.gov/puco/index.cfm/industry-information/statistical-reports/ohio-utility-rate-survey/
#sthash.T2WPVzCs.dpbs (last visited Oct. 29, 2015) for monthly electricity price data.
Compare, for example, the July-December 2014 time period with February-June 2015.
111.
See Tom Randall, While You Were Getting Worked Up over Oil Prices, This Just Happened to Solar, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 29, 2014, 4:53 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-10-29/while-you-were-getting-worked-up-over-oil-prices-this-just-happenedto-solar.
112.
See supra Part II.E., Utility Bill Transparency.
113.
See ARJUN MAKHIJANI, INST. FOR ENERGY & ENVTL. RESEARCH, CARBON-FREE AND NUCLEAR-FREE: A ROADMAP FOR U.S. ENERGY POLICY 32–33, 43, 106 (2007).
114.
Eric Rosenbloom, The Drawbacks of Wind Power Far Outweigh the Benefits, in ENERGY
ALTERNATIVES 140, 141 (Barbara Passero ed., 2006).
115.
See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN ., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0383(2015), ANNUAL
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 at A-32 to A-33, E-12 (2015), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/
0383(2015).pdf.
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be quite high.116 The all-in cost of wind power “is what consumers and
society as a whole pay both to purchase wind-generated electricity and also
to subsidize the wind energy industry through taxes and government
debt.”117 When other costs, such as capital costs, operating costs, capacity
factors, and costs of government subsidies, are considered, the true cost of
wind power could be 48% higher than previous estimates.118 Therefore, S.B.
310 allows customers to make an informed decision about the tradeoffs between energy mandates and cost. If, after seeing how energy mandates directly affect them, ratepayers determine the benefits of renewable energy
outweigh the cost, then they can be said to have approved the increased
costs through acquiescence. After S.B. 310, ratepayers will at least have the
information necessary to determine if their support for renewable energy
outweighs the cost.
However, even the cost on the bill may not accurately reflect the longterm costs and externalities associated with dramatic increases in reliance on
renewable energy, particularly wind generation.119 The purpose of this Note
is not to give an in-depth analysis on the functionality of wind generation,
nor is it to provide a complicated economic analysis on the feasibility of
116.
RANDY T. SIMMONS , ET AL., UTAH STATE UNIV., THE TRUE COST OF ENERGY: WIND 36
(2015), http://www.strata.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Full-Report-True-Cost-of-Wind1
.pdf.
117.
Id. at 3.
118.
Id. at 36. It should be noted that the study does not account for the value placed on
reduced carbon emissions caused by utilizing wind power instead of fossil fuel generation
plants. Id. at 32–33.
119.
President Obama has cited several European nations as models for renewable energy and “green” technology. See Spain’s Solar Deals on Edge of Bankruptcy as Subsidies Founder,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 18, 2010, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201010-18/spanish-solar-projects-on-brink-of-bankruptcy-as-subsidy-policies-founder (“Obama
praised Spain as a model of green-energy-driven economic transformation.”). However, some
recent studies indicate such models have not been as successful as previously anticipated. In
Spain, one study found that “each green job created . . . cost Spanish taxpayers $770,000
[and] [e]ach Wind Industry job cost $1.3 million to create.” Dale Hurd, Spain’s Green Disaster
a Lesson for America, CBN NEWS (Dec. 26, 2011), http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/finance/
2011/november/spains-green-disaster-a-lesson-for-america/. Further, “Spain’s green technology dream was costing the nation more than $15 billion a year before the government had to
slash it because it failed and Spain was going broke.” Id. Similarly, in Germany the government has launched a trillion-euro initiative to reduce the country’s reliance on nuclear and
fossil fuels. Matthew Karnitschnig, Germany’s Expensive Gamble on Renewable Energy: Companies Worry Cost of Plan to Trim Nuclear, Fossil Fuels Will Undermine Competitiveness, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 26, 2014, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/germanys-expensive-gamble-on-renewable-energy-1409106602. However, in the past five years the average electricity bill has
increased 60% “because of costs passed along as part of government subsidies of renewable
energy producers. Id. Prices are now more than double those in the U.S.” Id. Since the
German government passes subsidy costs along to consumers in the form of a surcharge, the
market price for electricity has gone down while the consumer prices have increased.
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wind turbines. However, a brief analysis of both is necessary to understand
why Ohio lawmakers felt the need to reexamine the RPS mandates.
The value of industrial wind generation is often assessed in terms of
“direct savings that . . . result due to the use of the wind rather than the
most likely alternative [fuel source].”120 In other words, wind generation
results in avoided costs by reducing fuel-use that would otherwise be consumed by traditional generation plants.121 Furthermore, since an industrial
wind turbine’s fuel source, wind, is free, they are often associated with low
cost energy production. However, evaluating wind generation exclusively
based on relative fuel costs or the avoided cost of alternative generation is
overly simplistic.122 In fact, opponents of wind generation argue that it is
often more expensive and less efficient than traditional electricity generation methods.123
One of the biggest shortcomings of wind-generated electricity is intermittency.124 Since wind is intermittent, it is not possible to increase output to coincide with demand.125 Therefore, “the variability of wind energy
necessitates the addition of reserve capacity other than wind that can be
tapped when the wind falls below the forecasted level over a period of hours
or days.”126 In other words, wind energy requires redundant generation capacity from a source that is able to match fuel supply with load increase or
decrease.127 Redundancy is both expensive and inefficient.
120.
J.F. MANWELL ET AL., WIND ENERGY EXPLAINED: THEORY, DESIGN AND APPLICATION 521
(2d ed. 2009).
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
See ROSS R. MCKITRICK, FRASER INST., ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
ONTARIO’S GREEN ENERGY ACT 15 (2013), http://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/environmental-and-economic-consequences-ontarios-green-energy-act.pdf. Doctor Ross McKitrick is a Professor of Economics and CBE Chair in Sustainable Commerce at the
University of Guelph in Ontario Canada and has written extensively on environmental economics and policy analysis. Ross R. McKitrick, CV, talks, bio, etc., http://www.rossmckitrick
.com/cv-talks-bio-etc.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2015).
124.
MAKHIJANI, supra note 113, at 31–32.
125.
In his testimony before the Ohio Energy Mandates Study Committee on March 18,
2015, Andrew Ott, Executive Vice President of Markets for PJM, testified that
[b]ecause wind and solar are intermittent renewable resources, PJM values their
capacity contribution at 13 percent and 38 percent respectively of their nameplate
capacity. This means for example that of the 8,800 MW of wind resources that are
expected to be in operation by 2017, these resources contribute only about 1,150
MW of capacity or reliability value.
Hearing Before the Ohio Energy Mandates Study Comm., 131st Gen. Assemb. (Oh. 2015) (statement of Andrew Ott, Executive Vice President, Markets for PJM Interconnection) [hereinafter Ott Testimony], http://emsc.legislature.ohio.gov/Assets/Testimony/31815-andrew-ott.pdf.
126.
MAKHIJANI, supra note 113, at 32.
127.
Id. at 33.
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Another inefficiency associated with wind-generation electricity is the
temporal disconnect between available wind energy and demand.128 In other
words, wind power is often at low levels in the morning, a time when demand is traditionally increasing, and often increases in the evening as demand tends to decrease.129 In fact, data indicates that, in some areas, wind
output and demand are anti-correlated such that “[w]ind power . . .is heavily concentrated at times of the year when demand is at a minimum, and
declines during times when demand is rising.”130 This disconnect of generation from demand is problematic because excess surplus can create strain on
the electric grid and, in some cases, must be exported at a loss.131
This problem is often exacerbated by government intervention aimed at
incentivizing wind energy generation. For example, some states and countries provide a guaranteed, above-market rate for wind generation, a policy
known as a feed-in tariff.132 Such intervention schemes may lead to the
perverse incentive of generating unneeded electricity at higher-than-market
rates. Though it should be noted that Ohio does not have a feed-in tariff
system, wind generation units are federally subsidized through a variety of
tax and grant incentives.133 Governmental incentives for renewable energy
projects can be particularly problematic in deregulated electricity markets.134 Since renewables such as wind and solar have zero fuel costs, renewable energy providers selling electricity into electricity auctions are
128.
See MCKITRICK, supra note 123, at 12.
129.
AUDITOR GEN. OF ONTARIO, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR-GENERAL OF
ONTARIO 111 (2011), http://www.auditor.on.ca/en/reports_en/en11/2011ar_en.pdf [hereinafter
ONTARIO ANNUAL REPORT].
130.
MCKITRICK, supra note 123, at 16.
131.
See ONTARIO ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 129, at 112. For example, Germany has over
21,000 wind turbines and “[i]n extreme cases, wind turbines and conventional power plants
in eastern Germany produce three to four times the total amount of electricity actually being
used. This surplus places a great strain on the eastern German ‘supergrid’.” Richard Fuchs,
Wind Energy Surplus Threatens Eastern Germany Power Grid, EUROPEAN DIALOGUE (Jan. 4,
2011), http://www.eurodialogue.eu/Wind-energy-surplus-threatens-eastern-German-powergrid.
132.
MANWELL ET AL., supra note 120, at 529.
133.
See generally North Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center, DATABASE OF STATE
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (DSIRE), http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program?state=OH&technology=8& (last visited Oct. 15, 2015).
134.
In regulated electricity markets, a single, vertically-integrated, utility company provides electric services and state public utility commissions set rates. In deregulated electricity markets, utility companies still provide distribution and transmission functions, but the
generation function is decoupled, allowing for competition in retail electricity sales. See
David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 774
(1998).
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incentivized to take any market price they receive above zero.135 Therefore,
renewable electricity providers, which have virtually no variable costs, are
able to sell electricity into the market at prices below those profitable for
coal and gas providers. While this situation may lead to lower electricity
costs in the short-run, market prices for renewables do not accurately reflect
their “all-in” costs. Due to their intermittency, renewables alone cannot provide a reliable base load136 and require back-up capacity from fossil fuel
facilities to ensure capacity will be able to meet demand.137 Since electricity
markets do not price reliability into clearing prices, price signals are too low
to spur investment in new generation facilities, a situation known as the
“missing money problem.”138 In fact, this flawed market structure, which
does not account for necessary backup generation capacity, has caused the
Ohio’s four largest EDUs to ask PUCO for price relief in an effort to save
certain generation facilities from being shut down.139
Finally, wind turbines are often strategically placed in high-wind areas
to maximize their generation capacity. Wind studies and various algorithms
are used to determine, to the extent possible, the optimal placement of wind
farms.140 Unfortunately, these ideal high-wind areas are often located in
rural areas, far away from where the electricity will ultimately be consumed.141 Therefore, wind generated electricity must be transmitted over
long distances to reach end-users.142 Not only does this lead to inefficiencies
due to line loss143 but also requires immense and costly upgrades to the
135.
LAWRENCE J. MAKOVICH ET AL., IHS CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RES. ASSOC., POWER SUPPLY
COST RECOVERY: BRIDGING THE MISSING MONEY GAP 9–10 (2013).
136.
Energy Info. Admin, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, B, GLOSSARY, http://www.eia.gov/tools/
glossary/index.cfm?id=B (last visited Aug. 7, 2015) (defining base load electricity as “[t]he
minimum amount of electric power delivered or required over a given period of time at a
steady rate.”).
137.
See supra note 125.
138.
See MAKOVICH ET AL., supra note 135, at 5.
139.
Dan Gearino, Electricity Companies Seek Some Regulation, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug.
10, 2014, 8:11 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2014/08/10/electricity
-companies-seek-some-regulation.html.
140.
See generally S.A. Grady et al., Placement of Wind Turbines Using Genetic Algorithms,
30 RENEWABLE ENERGY 259 (2005) (describing case studies using various algorithms to determine optimal placement of wind turbines).
141.
See ANDREW MILLS ET AL., ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’ L LAB ., LBNL1471E, THE COST OF TRANSMISSION FOR WIND ENERGY: A REVIEW OF TRANSMISSION PLANNING
STUDIES 1 (2009), https://publications.lbl.gov/islandora/object/ir%3A152737/datastream/PDF
/view.
142.
Id.
143.
Line loss refers to the energy that, due to resistance, is lost to heat as electricity is
transmitted across the wires. Even at high voltage the amount of electricity lost in a typical
transmission system is ten percent. TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN ET AL., ALTERNATING CURRENTS: ELECTRICITY MARKETS & PUBLIC POLICY 19–20 (2002).
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transmission systems to tie these wind farms into existing infrastructure.144
Since Ohio wind projects are typically located in rural areas with lower
demand, transmission upgrades are necessary to transmit wind-generated
energy to higher demand areas within the state, such as Cleveland and
Cincinnati.
Despite their inefficiencies and increased costs, wind and other renewable energy alternatives may overcome their shortcomings by significantly
reducing greenhouse gas emissions vis-à-vis fossil fuel electricity generation. Certainly, monetary costs cannot be the only factor used to determine
the value of renewable energy. Environmental effects and negative externalities must be considered when assessing the cost of any energy alternative.145 As such, wind energy has been identified as one of the lowest life
cycle emitters of carbon dioxide among all renewable energy technologies.146 Therefore, assuming carbon emissions from fossil fuel electricity
generation plants are causing significant environmental and climate
changes, wind-generated electricity may aid in halting or reversing that
trend. Renewable energy does, in fact, have economic and efficiency tradeoffs.147 Consumers should be able to evaluate these tradeoffs and be made
aware of both the benefits and costs of renewable electricity generation.
Consequently, the hidden and potentially high cost of wind power may have
been one of the driving forces behind the passage of S.B. 310. S.B. 310
offered transparency to customers who otherwise may have been unaware of
the hidden costs of renewable energy mandates. Ultimately, S.B. 310 allows
policymakers and consumers the opportunity to assess the effects of these
trade-offs in Ohio and determine whether the costs outweigh the benefits
for their constituents.

D. Changed Economic Conditions and the
Emergence of Domestic Energy
Since Ohio implemented its RPS mandate in 2009, the economic and
energy landscape within the state has changed dramatically. In 2009, the
United States was in the midst of the worst economic recession in de144.
MILLS ET AL., supra note 141, at 45.
145.
Jeremy Firestone & Jeffrey P. Kehne, Wind, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY, supra
note 25, at 361, 367.
146.
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ELECTRICITY FROM RENEWABLE RESOURCES:
STATUS, PROSPECTS, AND IMPEDIMENTS 204 (2009), http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_
id=12619&page=204.
147.
See John A. Baden & Pete Geddes, Environmental Entrepreneurs: Keys to Achieving
Wilderness Conservation Goals, 76 DENV. U. L. REV 519, 527 (1999) (“Economists understand
that whatever people claim, environmental quality is only one of several competing values
they seek. They must trade-off more of some values for less of another.”).
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cades.148 Also, the availability of affordable in-state energy, mostly natural
gas, increased dramatically between 2008 and 2013. In fact, natural gas
prices in Ohio dropped nearly thirty-five percent from 2008 to 2013.149
According to Ohio Senator Shannon Jones, the environment under which
S.B. 221 was passed was very different than the environment Ohio is currently in.150 In fact, a principle motivation behind the original RPS and
EERS mandates was to avoid “rate shock” whereby ratepayers were subject
to wild swings in electricity costs due to upswings in natural gas prices.151
What the legislature did not anticipate at the time, however, was the dramatic drop in price of natural gas, nor did they contemplate what shale
development could mean for the long-term energy availability within the
state.152 In fact, in a 2014 concurring opinion, then-Chairman of the Public
Utilities Commission of Ohio Todd Snitchler, recognized these changed
conditions, stating that:
Recently it has been stated in Senate legislative hearings that
Ohio’s current energy circumstances are not the same as in 2008;
that statement is quite correct. Many changes have occurred in
Ohio’s energy marketplace in the . . . 5 years since the passage of
S.B. 221, including: the economic recession and resulting impact on
electricity demand [and] . . . the changing cost and sources of
fuel . . . .153
148.
ALAN J. AUERBACH & WILLIAM G. GALE, URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., THE
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE FISCAL CRISIS: 2009 AND BEYOND 1 (2009), http://www.brookings.edu
/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2009/2/19-fiscal-future-gale/0219_fiscal_future_gale.pdf.
149.
See Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Data, NATURAL GAS (Aug. 31, 2015),
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pri_sum_dcu_SOH_a.htm. During this time period, residential natural gas prices fell from $12.68 per thousand cubic feet to $9.46 per thousand
cubic feet. Id.
150.
Senate Floor Debate, May 7, 2014, 130th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Oh. 2014)
(statement of Sen. Shannon Jones) (video recording), http://www.ohiochannel.org/MediaLi
brary/MediaLibraryEmbed/OhioSenate/Media.aspx?fileId=143636.
151.
Id.
152.
Id. In her floor testimony, Senator Jones noted that she voted in favor of S.B. 221
at the time, but that time was “distinctly different seven years ago than it is today.” Id. At the
time, the legislature knew that RPS and EERS standards would be expensive but they were
cheaper than their perceived alternative, building new base load coal plants to replace an
aging inventory of generation. Id. She noted, however, that “none of us anticipated a dramatic drop in the cost of things like natural gas . . . [, and] we certainly never anticipated this
huge shale development that is happening in the eastern part of the state . . . [and] are in a
very different position in 2014 than we were in 2007 and 2008.” Id.
153.
Comm’n Investigation of Ohio’s Retail Electric Serv. Mkt., Public Util. Comm’n of
Ohio, No. 12-3151-EL-COI, at *41 (Mar. 24, 2014) (Chairman Snitchler, concurring), https:/
/dis.puc.state.oh.us/TiffToPDf/A1001001A14C26B43025G70551.pdf.
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Due to advances in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling technology in conjunction with the discovery of several large shale reserves, the
United States is expected to increase natural gas production by an average
rate of 1.4% per year until 2040.154 In fact, it is anticipated that the United
States will transition from a net importer of natural gas to a net exporter
during the same period.155 Traditionally, natural gas from western states
such as Texas and Oklahoma had to be transported to eastern states. However, recent discoveries of natural gas reserves in shale formations of the
Appalachia region are projected to exceed 100% of demand for New England and the Mid-Atlantic.156 S.B. 310 may have been passed to allow
Ohio to utilize energy resources that were not envisioned at the time the
mandates were passed. For instance, under the RPS moratorium, the
EMSC has time to understand how these newfound resources will fit into
Ohio’s overall energy portfolio. Consequently the economic changes and
new sources of domestic energy discussed above could have been logical
motivators for the passage of S.B. 310. Furthermore, with an increasing
abundance of local natural gas energy nationwide, other states would be
wise to follow Ohio’s “freeze and evaluate” model.

IV. S.B. 310 SHOULD BE

A

MODEL FOR OTHER STATES

By adopting a moratorium on the RPS and EERS mandates, Ohio legislators showed that they were adaptive to changing conditions within the
state. In fact, one of the primary qualities of an effective legislator is her
ability to be adaptable “and [be] prepared to reassess and reconsider a previously determined course of action. When circumstances change, the [legislator] is then able to adapt to the new conditions quickly, and adjust tactics
and strategies.”157 Ohio legislators passed S.B. 310 in order to reassess the
current energy paradigm in light of changed circumstances. This type of
prudent lawmaking can serve as a model for other similarly situated states.
Ohio may already be starting a trend among states to reevaluate its
RPSs in light of ever-changing domestic energy conditions. As of August
2014, twenty-four states had energy efficiency standards in place; recently,
however, two states have rolled back their energy efficiency mandates.158
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN ., supra note 115, at A-1.
Id.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN ., U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0383(2014), ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014, at MT-25 (2014), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2014).pdf.
157.
THOMAS H. LITTLE & DAVID B. OGLE, THE L EGISLATIVE BRANCH OF STATE GOVERNMENT:
PEOPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS 85 (2006).
158.
Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS), AM . COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT
ECON., http://aceee.org/topics/energy-efficiency-resource-standard-eers (last visited Aug. 23,
2015).
154.
155.
156.
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Like Ohio, Indiana reevaluated energy efficiency mandates in the face of
increasing economic strain on large energy-intensive companies.159 In 2014,
Indiana passed Senate Bill 340, which was intended to relieve manufacturers of the burden of increased electricity costs by allowing industrial customers the opportunity to opt-out of energy efficiency programs.160 The
Indiana opt-out provision, similar to that in Ohio S.B. 310, allowed for
increased focus on energy efficiency while allowing manufacturers within
the state to remain competitive in a global marketplace.161 Again, the optout provision represents a compromise, allowing job-creating manufacturers
to reduce energy usage in a cost effective manner and, like Ohio’s S.B. 310,
allows opt-out customers the opportunity to opt back in to the utility’s portfolio plan if it subsequently becomes more cost-effective.162
In February 2015, West Virginia repealed its RPS, which had been in
place since 2009.163 Upon signing House Bill 2001, which repealed the West
Virginia RPS, Governor Tomlin pointed to changed circumstances within
the state as necessitating the repeal, stating, “We understand economic drivers and factors change over time, and the Act as it was passed in 2009 is no
longer beneficial for our state.”164 Similarly, the Colorado Senate recently
approved a bill to reduce their RPS requirements to 15% from 30% for the
years 2020 and thereafter.165 Recently Texas, a state which generates more

159.
See S.E.A. 340, 118th Gen. Assemb., Second Reg. Sess., (Ind. 2014), 2014 Ind.
Acts *1–4, (codified at IND. CODE § 8-1-8.5-9(f) (2014)).
160.
Id.
161.
See Press Release, Governor Mike Pence, Governor Pence Calls for New Direction
of Energy Efficiency in Indiana (Mar. 27, 2014). Indiana governor, Mike Pence, allowed
Indiana Senate Bill 340 to become law without his signature, stating, “Low-cost energy is an
essential element of Indiana’s economic development and prosperity. The simple fact is that
higher energy costs will cost Indiana jobs. By reducing our need for electricity, we reduce
our need to build expensive power plants at a cost to Hoosier ratepayers. For this reason, I
believe that energy efficiency is an important part of our ‘all of the above’ energy strategy . . . . I could not veto this bill because doing so would increase the cost of utilities for
Hoosier ratepayers and make Indiana less competitive by denying relief to large electricity
consumers, including our state’s manufacturing base.” Id.
162.
See S.E.A. 340, 118th Gen. Assemb., Second Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2014), 2014 Ind. Acts
*2 (codified at IND. CODE § 8-1-8.5-9(f) (2014)).
163.
See H.B. 2001, 2015 Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2015), 2015 W. Va. Acts *1 (codified at W.
VA. CODE § 24-2F (2015)).
164.
See Press Release, Gov. Earl Ray Tomblin, Governor Tomblin Approves Repeal of
Alternative Renewable Energy Portfolio Act (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.governor.wv.gov/
media/pressreleases/2015/Pages/GOVERNOR-TOMBLIN-APPROVES-REPEAL-OFALTERNATIVE-RENEWABLE-ENERGY-PORTFOLIO-ACT.aspx.
165.
See S.B. 15-044, 70th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2015), 2015 Colo. Sess. Laws
*3.
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electricity from wind resources than any other, introduced a bill to repeal its
RPS as of 2015.166
As these cases illustrate, prudent lawmaking requires constant evaluation of current and future conditions. As the energy sector in the United
States continues to expand, States should reconsider current energy and
environmental policies to strike a balance between resource utilization and
environmental considerations. Interestingly, natural gas seems to exemplify
a balance between domestic energy utilization and environmental prudence.
Switching to natural gas for electricity generation offers an immediate reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. On average, natural-gas fired generation in the United States produces 50% less carbon dioxide than coal-fired
generation.167 And while it would be ideal, from an environmental perspective, to abandon fossil fuel generation altogether, “that is not an option for
either the short or medium term.”168 Therefore, natural gas production offers potentially significant reductions in carbon dioxide emissions while allowing states to exploit abundant domestic energy. Thus, in light of
changing economic and domestic energy conditions, a “freeze and evaluate”
approach is prudent and should be considered by other energy-producing
states.

CONCLUSION
Ohio S.B. 310 was not, as critics contend, passed primarily for the benefit of several large interest groups. Instead, it was passed to provide customers with more transparency regarding the costs of wind energy and in
response to the changed economic and energy conditions in Ohio. Thanks
to S.B. 310, Ohio lawmakers have an opportunity to assess the costs and
benefits of a law that radically transformed the state’s environmental and
166.
See Angela Neville, Wind Energy Faces Strong Head Winds in Austin, TEXAS LAWYER
(Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.texaslawyer.com/home/id=1202722579568/Wind-Energy-FacesStrong-Head-Winds-in-Austin?mcode=1202616608548&curindex=2&slreturn=20150309184
257.
167.
See Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, How Much Carbon Dioxide is Produced When Different Fuels Are Burned?, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://www.eia.gov/
tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=73&t=11 (last updated Aug. 31, 2015) (reporting that natural gas emits
117 pounds of CO2 per million Btus of energy while anthracite and bituminous coal emit
228.6 and 205.7 pounds respectively). But see Ramón A. Alvarez et al., Greater Focus Needed
on Methane Leakage from Natural Gas Infrastructure, 109 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF
SCIS. 6435 (2012) (noting that while natural gas-fired generation has lower carbon emissions
than coal-fired generation, methane leakage from the production of natural gas may offset
the environmental benefits).
168.
Paul Breeze, Coping with Carbon: A Near-Term Strategy to Limit Carbon Dioxide
Emissions from Power Stations, 366 PHIL. TRANS. ROYAL SOC’Y ACADS. 3891, 3892 (2008), http://
rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/roypta/366/1882/3891.full.pdf.
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electricity policy. As Ohio Senator Troy Balderson noted, the purpose of
S.B. 310 was diversity and to ensure that all of Ohio’s resources are utilized
as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible.169
S.B. 310 did not repeal Ohio’s RPS. Instead, through compromise, it
created the EMSC to assess Ohio’s current regulatory landscape. S.B. 310’s
two-year moratorium on the RPS and EE mandates was necessary to give
the EMSC time to conduct its assessment without the risk of rapidly escalating benchmarks severely straining ratepayers. The environmental and energy landscape of the United States has changed drastically since the
implementation of Ohio’s RPS and EERS mandates five years ago. As
such, prudent lawmaking requires reassessment of laws based on changed
circumstances. And while the complete abandonment of fossil fuel generated electricity is certainly a worthwhile long-term goal, S.B. 310 allows
Ohio to balance economic and environmental concerns in the short term.
The rest of the nation would be wise to follow Ohio’s lead.

169.
2015).

Telephone Interview with Sen. Troy Balderson, sponsor of Ohio S.B. 310 (Feb. 11,
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